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contemporaneous because of a nontraumatic injury" or a peculiar
state rule as in Bizer,5 it is clear that state law determines whether

an actionable wrong has been committed, but federal law determines
when a "claim accrues" for the purpose of starting the federal period

of limitations.
Robert Ted Enloe, III

State Ratable Purchase Orders - Conflict
With the Natural Gas. Act
I. STATE-FEDERAL DIVISION OF CONTROL

The Natural Gas Act of 1938' provides for Federal Power Commission control over the sale and, transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce. The purpose of the Act was not to divest state
commissions of their regulatory authority over conservation,' but
to "fill the gap" thought to exist because of the constitutional
limits on the states' power to regulate interstate commerce.' Although
the exact line of federal-state demarcation is somewhat elusive, there
are some areas in which the proper regulatory authority is relatively
settled. The state's control over the "production and gathering" of
natural gas is preserved by section 717(b) of the Natural Gas Act.4
But this area of state control has been narrowly confined to the
physical act of drawing gas from the earth' and does not include a
producer's sales at the wellhead for resale in interstate commerce.'
Within the area of "production and gathering," however, the state
has control over the drilling and spacing of wells,' the conservation
of oil and gas and their by-products,' and the protection of the correlative rights of owners in a common reservoir through proration or
allowable orders directed at producers.9
"See United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958), discussed in notes 23-36
supra
5 7 and accompanying text.
Bizer v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
1 52 Stat. 821-33 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(w) (1958).
2H.R.
Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1937).
a Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 684 (1954).
452 Stat. 821-33 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
' Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 692 (1947); Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
'Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); Deep So. Oil Co. v. FPC,
247 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1957).
'Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 69 (1937); Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
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The federal government has exclusive control over gas rates in
interstate commerce, and any attempt by a state to control rates directly has been held invalid both before ° and after 1 the passage of
the Natural Gas Act. Neither can the state indirectly affect interstate
rates, for example, by ordering an interstate pipeline company to extend its facilities to more wells within the state." Furthermore, a
state cannot set minimum prices at the wellhead under the guise of
conservation." The United States Supreme Court announced in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin that "Congress sought to regulate wholesales of natural gas at both ends of the interstate transmission system.'
When a sale for resale in interstate commerce
takes place, the "gathering process" is over,' and at that point, the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission attaches."
Moreover, the Court has said: "[I]n a borderline case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it
cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority
governs.""7
II.

RATABLE TAKE ORDERS AND THE FEDERAL-STATE DIVISION

Although various state statutes differ as to what constitutes ratable
taking," "the practical definition of ratability amounts to allowing

each producer a fair opportunity to produce that share of the field
reserve which is proportionate to his well's allocation factor.""
Ratability is important in oil and gas production because nonproportionate taking causes low pressure points which force minerals
in a common reservoir to flow toward the over-produced well. The
basic interest of the state in this area, of course, is to protect correlative rights by balancing the production of the common reservoir
owners. As early as 1900, the Supreme Court recognized the states'
,OMissouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
"Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).
"Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 304 U.S. 179 (1950), held that minimum prices were no violation of the due process or equal protection clauses. But see Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955), which held that such pricing encroached upon federal jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act.
14347 U.S. 672, 684 (1954).
"Ibid.; Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 692 (1947).
"Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955); see also Cities Serv.
Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 180 Kan. 454, 304 P.2d 528, 534 (1956), rev'd, 355 U.S.
391 (1958), construing a minimum price order as a condition precedent to production.
" FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1961).
"Comment, Ratable Taking of Natural Gas, 11 Sw. L.J. 358 (1957).
"'Jacobs, Governmental Regulation of Gas Production, L.S.U. 4th Ann, Inst. of Mineral

Law 43, 60 (1956).

1963 ]

NOTES

power in this area by holding in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,"° that an
Indiana conservation statute did not violate the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that a state's
"legislative power . .. can be manifested for the purpose of pro-

tecting all the collective owners ... ."" This position has been sustained in numerous subsequent decisions."2
Thus, the state possesses an undisputed, legitimate interest in protecting the correlative rights of common owners. However, not all
state orders designed to achieve ratability have been upheld. Seemingly inconsistant decisions may be reconciled by careful consideration of two decisive factors. First, confusion has arisen because different results have been reached depending on the grounds upon which
various state orders have been challenged, i.e., whether the orders were
attacked as being a violation of the fourteenth amendment, an undue
burden on interstate commerce, or an invasion of exclusive federal
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. Secondly, it now appears
that although the end result sought by the state authorities may be
within their power, the means used to achieve those ends will fail
if conflict with federal authority results.
An illustration of the first point is presented in Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co." In that case, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued an order establishing a minimum wellhead
price. The Supreme Court held that this minimum price order was
not an undue burden on interstate commerce and that there was no
violation of the due process or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court specified that the question of
whether the order was in conflict with the Natural Gas Act was not
before the Court." Five years later when a minimum price order was
challenged as being in conflict with the Natural Gas Act, the Court
held that the order was an invalid encroachment on exclusive federal
jurisdiction."' Thus, it is clear that state orders previously upheld
on constitutional grounds must be re-examined in light of the
Natural Gas Act.
Secondly, it now seems that the means used by the state to achieve
ratability make a vital difference in determining whether the state
has validly exercised its authority. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
2' 177 U.S. 190

(1900).
21M. at 210.
22 E.g., see Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 378 (1939); Walls v.
Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 317 (1920).
23 340 US. 179 (1950); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190

(1950).
"4Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil Co., supra note 23, at 188-89.
"Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955).
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recognized the states' power to regulate ratable taking through orders
directed at producers." A leading case on this point, Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,27 held that the state commission orders,
limiting production to market demand and requiring ratable production by all producers from a common source, were not a violation

of the commerce clause. The Court in Champlin pointed out: "[T]he
proration established by the commission appl[ies] only to production and not to sales or transportation of crude oil or its products.
Such production is essentially a mining operation and therefore is
not a part of interstate commerce even though the product obtained
is intended to be and in fact is immediately shipped in such commerce. 2 In subsequent cases, the Court has spoken only of the
states' power to regulate production." In Northern Natural Gas Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n,s state orders designed to achieve the same
ends as those in the Champlin case were struck down by the Court.
This decision brings to the foreground the possibility that the decisive
factor in determining the validity of state orders is the means used
by the state to achieve the desired ends rather than the ends themselves. The Northern case is the first to consider ratable purchase
orders in this light."1
III. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n"
Northern Natural Gas Co. is an interstate pipeline company whose
pipeline system is connected to some 1,100 gas wells in the Kansas
Hugoton Field. Northern's oldest gas contracts are with Republic
Natural Gas Co., a producer, and under the "Republic A" contract,
as modified,3 Northern is required to purchase up to the maximum
2'Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 227 (1943); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1937).
27286 U.S. 210 (1932).
21 Id. at 235. For a discussion of the fact that this interpretation of the commerce clause
is now antiquated and that allowable orders may be in jeopardy, see text accompanying note
55 infra.
29See note 26 supra.
" 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
31 The FPC, in denying jurisdiction over the orders involved in the Northern case, said:
"[T]hese are matters which lie within the sphere of state control and cannot constitute as
basis for intervention in the proceedings before the commission." Indeed, as the dissenting
opinion points out, in the 1958 term the Court dismissed an appeal from a commission
order requiring ratable purchasing. Permian Basin Pipeline Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 358
U.S. 37 (1958), dismissing appeal from 302 S.W.2d 238. (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.
3a 3 7 2 U.S. 84 (1963).
asThe original "Republic A" contract fixed the minimum take requirements in terms
of a percentage of Northern's requirements for a particular district. This original contract
was modified by a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in 1952 holding that Northern's
purchases from Republic could not exceed Republic's allowables. Northern Natural Gas
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production allowables from Republic's wells. Under its contracts
with producers other than Republic, Northern was obligated to purchase only so much of its requirements as were not satisfied by purchases from Republic. Until 1958, Northern's requirements were
such that its purchases were roughly ratable, but after 1958 this
purchasing pattern resulted in substantial underages in wells other
than Republic's and corresponding overages in Republic's wells." To
alleviate this situation and protect the correlative rights of the
owners, the Kansas Corporation Commission issued an order directing
Northern to purchase gas ratably from all wells to which it was connected. 5 Faced with the choice of complying with the Commission
orders and breaching the Republic contract or of ignoring the Commission's orders and thereby subjecting itself to criminal penalties,
Northern complied with the orders" and challenged them in the
courts on the ground that they unconstitutionally invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the
Natural Gas Act. The Kansas Supreme Court sustained the orders of
the Commission; however, on appeal the United States Supreme
Court held that state orders directed at purchasers of natural gas
are beyond the authority of the state because of the federal jurisdiction granted by the Natural Gas Act.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan dismissed the
Commission's contention that the orders were within the "production and gathering" exemption of the Natural Gas Act. Mr. Justice
Brennan simply said that Northern, to whom the orders were directed, is a purchaser and that none of its activities in Kansas involves production and gathering. This conclusion is supported by
the earlier decisions that a sale ends the production and gathering
process."' " The danger of interference with the federal regulatory
Co. v. Republic Natural Gas Co., 172 Kan. 450; 241 P.2d 708 (1952). The effect of this
decision was to require Northern to purchase up to the maximum production allowables of
Republic's wells before buying from other producers.
" The imbalance occured in 1958 because of the increase in production allowables by
the Kansas commission in the face of a relatively static demand. This forced Northern,
under contract, to raise its purchases from Republic and lower correspondingly its take
from the other producers.
' There was both a general order embodied in Kan. Corp. Comm'n Rule No. 82-2-219
and an order directed specifically at appellant. Both orders were authorized by Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (Supp. 1959). It is immaterial which order is considered because both
were directed at purchasers and the effect of the Natural Gas Act would be the same. The
order aimed directly at Northern is dated October 7, 1959, and reads as follows: "The
Northern Natural Gas Company is hereby ordered to take gas ratably from all wells to
which it is connected in the Kansas Hugoton field."
'Compliance
with the orders resulted in a breach of the "Republic A" contract. At
this writing, a suit is pending in the District Court of Stephens County, Kansas against
Northern for breach of that contract.
"7See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
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scheme arises because these orders are unmistakably and unambiguously directed at purchasers who take gas in Kansas for resale after
transportation in interstate commerce.""
The issue that forms the heart of the opinion, and is important in
the dissent as well, is whether state orders seeking to achieve a balance
of correlative rights are valid in spite of a technical invasion of
federal authority. The Court reiterated, "There is no doubt that
the States do possess power to allocate and conserve scarce natural
resources upon and beneath their lands.""0 According to the majority,
the test is not the existence or even the scope of the state's power
to conserve its natural resources, but the constitutional validity of
the particular means chosen to exercise the state's conceded power.
In light of the fact that these means are not within the "production
and gathering exemption" because directed at purchasers rather than
producers of natural gas, the Court concluded that such orders cannot stand "when they threaten, as here, the achievement of the
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation.""0
Although the Court discussed at some length the quantitative
impact of these orders upon the cost structure of gas in interstate
commerce, it must be emphasized that this was not the basis of the
decision. This can be seen by examining two factors. First, the Court
reaffirmed its decision in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n41 by stating that regulations aimed at producers are not
part of interstate commerce and hence are under state regulatory
control. Thus, if the Court continues to stand by its interpretation
of the Champlin case, orders directed at producers would be valid
regardless of the effect upon cost structures." Secondly, the Court
rejected the suggestion that the state orders would be valid if the
"Republic A" contract could be harmonized with them so as to
eliminate the "adverse" effect upon cost structures." The Court said
that this latter argument "misconceives the true nature of the question"" and that even if the suggested accommodations could be made,
the validity of such a method would still have to be decided. Thus,
the means chosen by Kansas to achieve ratability must fail regards' 372 U.S. at 92 (1963).
3

9 id. at 93.
40 Id. at 94.
4' 286 U.S. 210 (1932); see also text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
42 But see text accompanying note 55 infra.
43 Moreover, as the dissent points out, had the orders of the Kansas Corporation Commission been allowed to stand, they might have produced a favorable effect on interstate
prices. Northern was paying more for the gas it purchased from Republic than from its
other producers.
44 372 U.S. at 97 (1963).
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less of the actual effect upon the prices of gas in interstate commerce.

The dissent argued that the most direct impact on interstate commerce is the allowable order; the majority, however, would answer
that if the means are legitimate, the orders will stand regardless of
possible conflict with the federal regulatory scheme.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By putting emphasis on the means chosen by Kansas to achieve
ratability, it is clear that the ratable purchase orders invaded the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the
Natural Gas Act. Considering the decisions which clearly hold that
federal regulation of natural gas begins at the wellhead, "' or even
before,"" it is clear that state regulatory orders directed "unambiguously" at purchasers encroach upon federal control. With the exception of the "physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth,""' the
regulation of natural gas destined for interstate sale is now federal
ground upon which the state may not tread.
An important administrative problem raised by the principal case
is the availability of effective alternatives by which a state can protect the correlative rights of owners from a common gas supply.
Although the Court said, "The State does not, however, appear
to be without alternative means,"" authorities in the field consider
the ability to enforce ratable purchasing to be essential to achieve
effective ratability."' In Railroad Comm'n v. Permian Basin Pipeline
Co.," the court said:
Ratable production and ratable take or purchase are essential in preventing drainage between leases, and are related to the prevention of
the above-ground waste, because if a producer cannot share the
domestic full market, the operator will try to find some other market,

one which might be inferior use of gas, such as the manufacture of
carbon black.
45See note 15 supra.
4See

note 16 supra.

4 See note 5 supra; Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n,

372 U.S. 84,

94 (1963).

4 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, supra note 47, at 94.
'°Comment, supra note 18; Kelly, Gas Proration, 19 Texas B.J. 763 (1956), proposed
that allowable orders have proven unsatisfactory in protecting correlative rights. Thompson,
Federal Encroachment On the Sovereign Power of the States, Sw. Leg. Found. 6th Inst. on
Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 33 (1955). "The foundation of the power of state conservation agencies
is their authority to require ratable taking of gas among all the producers in an area."
Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. State, 161 Okla. 104, 17 P.2d 488 (1932). All important
oil and gas producing states have long had "common purchaser" statutes to achieve ratability.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049a, §§ 8, 8a (1959); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 240

(1941). La. Rev. Stat. §§ 30:41-46 (1960).
"0302 S.W.2d 238, 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 358 U.S.

37 (1958).
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Common Purchaser statutes are more vital to gas producers than to
producers of oil since gas cannot be as readily stored as can oil, and
is not transportable by truck.
The Northern case also may create two of the primary evils that
the Natural Gas Act was designed to prevent. First, the Federal
Power Commission has not asserted any authority over pipeline companies to require ratable purchasing, and until it does so,5 there will
be no regulatory authority with jurisdiction over this important
aspect of gas production. Secondly, the decision may result in
inequality in consumer prices. If nonratabiity results in favor of
a producer with whom the purchaser has a low contract price, the
result will be lower prices for consumers who have the good fortune
to be serviced by that contract. However, this is little consolation to
consumers faced with the reverse situation.
An important legal problem also remains unanswered. What will
be the Court's attitude toward a state allowable order directed at
producers which materially affects the volume of gas already contractually committed to interstate commerce? A good case can be
made both for or against the validity of such an order. On the one
hand, the Court seemed to imply that the decisive point was that
the orders were directed at purchasers. Following this reasoning, it
would seem that an order directed at producers would be valid. As
mentioned
above, the Court reaffirmed its decision in the Cbamplin
55
case to the effect that state orders directed at producers are valid.
On the other hand, such a position seems logically untenable. As
the dissent forcefully points out, the most direct interference with
the "federal regulatory scheme" is the allowable order, and certainly
if ratability can be effectively achieved by the allowable method,
there would be no difference in the result. Moreover, the Court pointed out, "The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for
direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of natural
gas . .. or for state regulations which would indirectly reach the
same result." 4 If the states attempt to achieve ratability through
fluctuating allowables, it is clear that the result will be a very sub51This power is not directly conferred upon the FPC anywhere in the Natural Gas
Act. Even if the authority can be implied with regard to the interstate pipeline companies,
the FPC would seem to lack the power to govern the intrastate companies. Ratability
would be difficult under such circumstances.
" The dissent points out that this latter situation is present in the principal case.
Mr. Justice Harlan contends: "If appellant could reduce its take from Republic wells without
contractual liability, the over-all cost of its gas purchases would in all likelihood
decrease." 372 U.S. at 105.
53 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
14

372 U.S. at 91.

